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ABSTRACT
In this paper we present a simple model to show how distributional con-
cerns can engender social conflict. We have a two period model, where the
cost of conflict is endogenous in the sense that parties involved have full con-
trol over how much conflict they can create. Unlike the standard results our
model shows that it is not current inequality that is important for conflict,
rather it is the anticipated future inequality that plays a crucial role. The
anticipated inequality, however, has to be significant to result in conflict.
Also, as a result of the conflict, total output and growth in the economy is
lowered. Finally, in line with empirical evidence, our model also shows that
richer societies will have less conflict.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a simple model showing how distributional concerns
can engender social conflict. What we have in mind is the phenomena of
widescale demonstrations and protests leading to severe disruption of eco-
nomic activity that has become common in recent years1. Often, this has
stemmed from proposed economic reforms as in the case of South Asia2 and
Latin America (Sachs 1990). The literature on inequality and growth demon-
strate that inequality plays a crucial role in explaining conflict (Alesina and
Perrotti (1996), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Benabou (1998), Acemoglu
and Robinson (2001)). In particular, Rodrik (1998) and Bannerjee and Du-
flo (2000) have shown that higher inequality leads to more resources being
spent over resolving distributional conflicts, thereby leading to misallocation
of resources resulting in low growth. Here we use a similar framework to
show how inequality can result in conflict. More importantly, we hypoth-
esize that conflict may arise out anticipated future inequality rather than
current inequality.
Our model differs from earlier papers in three key areas. First, we take the
cost of conflict as endogenous, i.e. the parties involved have full control over
how much conflict they can create. Second, most of the literature in this area
are static. Therefore conflict in these models stems only from bargaining over
the distribution in that period. Relaxing this assumption allows us to derive
some interesting results. Third, the distribution of resources in our paper
depends on existing levels of wealth. The more wealthy a group gets relative
to the other, the higher bargaining power it has. It can use this increased
bargaining power to gain a larger share of the output3. Wealth inequality
1This is different from the other notions of conflict, such as wars and riots which are
based on violence. Refer to Nafziger et. al. (2000); Azam and Hoeffler (2000); Addision
et. al (2000) for discussions on violent conflicts.
2On April 16, 2002, the BBC reported: “Millions of state employed workers in India
have gone on nationwide strike to protest against proposed changes to labour laws in the
country, which have been described ‘anti-worker”’. [Italics added.]
In India, with the beginning of major reforms since the early 1990’s, strikes have been
a crucial instrument in the bargaining process with the government.
3This is similar to the models proposed by Grossman (1994), Skaperdas (1992), Hir-
shleifer (2001) where the distribution of final output depends on how much resources the
parties spend on increasing their bargaining power. However, unlike ours, in their model
resources can be used either to get a favourable distribution of the ouput or to produce a
higher overall output.
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then gets reflected in a more skewed distribution of income. When such
relative inequality becomes high enough, it forces the disadvantaged group
to initiate conflict4.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the
model used in the paper. Section 3 derives and discusses the results and
Section 4 concludes.
2 Model:Basic Framework
2.1 Agents
2.1.1 Production
Consider two groups, i = A,B, who are involved in production of an output
over two time periods, t = 1, 2. The agents can either go for joint production
or decide to produce on their own.
If they produce on their own, their endowments (or wealth, wit) is used as
an input in the production process along with their effort levels. We assume
that effort is indivisible, i.e. eit²{0, 1}. The output they receive is
Y it =
½
f(wit) when e
i
t = 1
0 when eit = 0.
. (1)
where f 0 > 0, f 00 < 0 and f 000 < 0.
For the joint production case, we assume that the capital, w, is given.
If w is very high compared to (wAt + w
B
t ) and the production is concave in
the level of wealth, there will be insignificant changes to the output even if
individuals bring their own wealth to the joint production. We assume such
is the case5. The joint output is given by
Yt =
½
Ft(w) when eAt = 1 and e
B
t = 1
0 when eAt = 0 or e
B
t = 0
. (2)
4Hirshleifer (1991) and Durham et. al. (1998) have shown that disadvantaged groups
can resort to conflict to improve their situations.
5We could on the other hand, allow the current wealth levels to affect the joint output.
In that case, we will have to rule out sequential investments. This means that in period
1 if the parties decide to produce jointly, they invest their wealth in the joint production.
The output in period 1 then depends on the total level of wealth invested. In the second
period, in case of joint output, there is no need for additional investments.
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We assume in period 2 the joint output grows by g percent over the
previous period.
2.1.2 Conflict
While both the groups have control over the production aspect, they have
little control over the distribution of the output. If any group is unhappy
with the distribution, it can use its leverage in the production process to
impact the distribution. This can take the form of slow-downs, strikes and
outright destruction of infrastructure.
If both the parties agree, the proposed output is produced. On the other
hand, any disagreement between the parties over the proposed output, results
in conflict leading to some loss in output. The bargaining then proceeds to
the next round. Both groups have the same ability to inflict damage. Let δ
represent the loss in output in each round of disagreements and nit represent
the number of times group i disagrees in time t. Then the total loss of output
in period t is δ.nt, where nt = max{nAt , nBt }.
Growth rate, g, gets affected negatively by the conflict in period 1. One
can imagine this to capture the situation where conflict leads to destruc-
tion of essential infrastructure, or leads to capital flight and low investment.
Therefore, higher the level of n1, lower would be g in period 2, i.e.
∆g(n1)
∆n1
< 0.
Also ∆
2g(n1)
∆n21
< 0.
2.1.3 Consumption and Savings
Each group maximizes
V i(ci1, c
i
2) = U
i
1(c
i
1) + U
i
2(c
i
2), (3)
s.t. ci1 + c
i
2 = y
i
1 + y
i
2,
where U it is the utility of group i in period t from consuming c
i
t and y
i
t is
the actual income of group i in period t. We further assume, U it (c
i
t) = c
i
t.
Both groups save a constant proportion, α, of their income i.e. si1 =
α.yi1,∀i. If parties decide to go for joint production in period 1, the total
wealth in period 2 for group i, is wi2 = r
i.(α.yi1 +w
i
1) where r
i is the interest
earned on the gross savings in period 1..
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2.2 Distribution
The distribution of the joint output follows the Nash bargaining solution
(henceforth NBS)6. Wealth, used as an input in this situation acts as a threat
point and hence relative wealth inequality matters in the outcome. The
Nash bargaining solution allows for a party to have a share of the output
even if that party does not have any wealth, and its opponents have some
wealth. This is a highly desirable property, especially for conflict situations
(Hirshleifer (1989)) and not all distribution rules share that property.
yAt =
1
2
(Yt −max{nAt , nBt }+ Y At − Y Bt ) (4)
yBt =
1
2
(Yt −max{nAt , nBt }− Y At + Y Bt ). (5)
2.3 The Game
This is a two period repeated game. In each period, there are three stages:
Stage 1: The distribution is determined using the NBS,
Stage 2: Knowing the distribution, the groups can decide either to pro-
duce on their own, or to produce jointly,
Stage 3: If they decide to produce jointly, then each party decides on nit.
3 Results and Analysis
3.1 Wealth equality in both periods
We start by considering the case with no wealth inequality i.e. wA1 = w
B
1 and
rA = rB. Notice rA = rB implies wA2 = w
B
2 . As Y
A
t = Y
B
t , ∀t under the NBS
we have,
yAt =
1
2
(Yt − δ.max{nAt , nBt }), (6)
yBt =
1
2
(Yt − δ.max{nAt , nBt }). (7)
6Instead of using the NBS explicitly, we could have used other kind of distribution rules
(or ‘contest success functions’) where the outcome depend on the relative difference in the
level of wealth. NBS, however, allows the model to be tractable and has easy intuitive
interpretation and strong axiomatic foundation.
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If yit > Y
i
t ,∀i, t, both groups will undertake joint production in both
periods. We then show that there is no conflict in the economy.
Proposition 1 Suppose yit > Y
i
t , ∀i, t. Under complete equality there would
be no conflict in any period.
Proof: First we show that there would be no conflict in period 2. Suppose
we know the consumption in period 1, then from (3), for any group i,
Max V i = max U i2(c
i
2).
In the last period everything will be consumed i.e. ci2 = y
i
2. Suppose
the initial division is such that cB2 ≥ cA2 . Since wA2 = wB2 , cB2 ≥ cA2 implies
yB2 ≥ yA2 . Now, if say group A wants to initiate conflict then nA2 > 0. This
means n2 > 0. The new distribution, using NBS, would be yB2 − δ2 ≥ y
A
2 − δ2 .
Clearly, it is not beneficial for group A to initiate conflict. It is easy to show
that even if yB2 ≤ yA2 , it is not beneficial for A to initiate conflict. Similarly
for group B. Therefore, whatever the outcome in period 1, in period 2,
nA2 = n
B
2 = 0.
Given that wA1 = w
B
1 , for period 1, one can easily show that, conflict is
not going to be beneficial for either party.. Hence, nA1 = n
B
1 = 0. Q.E.D.
We normalize Y1 = 1. Therefore Y2 = 1 + g(n1). Let g = g(0).
Remark 1. Since nit = 0 ∀i, t, the total output produced in the economy,
taking both periods into consideration, is Ymax = (2 + g).
3.2 Wealth inequality in period 2 only
Suppose due to some anticipated shock one group earns a higher rate of in-
terest on the savings, relative to the other group. Without loss of generality,
let rB > rA. In this case we have wA1 = w
B
1 and w
B
2 > w
A
2 .
Period 1 distribution is given by (6) and (7). In period 2, when wealth
levels are different the Nash bargaining solution will yield
yA2 =
1
2
(Y2 −max{nA2 , nB2 }+ f(wA2 )− f(wB2 )) (8)
yB2 =
1
2
(Y2 −max{nA2 , nB2 }− f(wA2 ) + f(wB2 )). (9)
We would show that in this case, it will be beneficial for A to increase
nA1 . First, we show the following:
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Proposition 2 Let yi2 > Y
i
2 ,∀i and wB2 > wA2 . There will be no conflict in
period 2. Hence, nA2 = n
B
2 = 0.
Proof: The arguments are similar to Proposition 1 and hence omitted.
Q.E.D.
For the next proposition we assume that yi1 > Y
i
1 ,∀i. We can now show
the following result.
Proposition 3 Let rB > rA. Group A will prefer to initiate conflict in
period 1 if the inequality is substantial, i.e. rB − βrA > γ, where β > 0,
γ > 0.
Proof: The proof proceeds in two steps. First when nA1 ≥ nB1 and second,
when nA1 < n
B
1 .
Step 1: When nA1 ≥ nB1 we show that group A will be better off increasing
nA1 . Clearly n1 = n
A
1 . Now, using (3), (6) (8) and Proposition 2 we can
write
V A = (1− α)1
2
(1− δ.max{nA1 , nB1 }) +
1
2
(1 + g(n1) + f(w
A
2 )− f(wB2 )) (10)
If A decides to increase the conflict then
∆V A
∆nA1
= −(1− α).δ
2
+
1
2
.
∆g(n1)
∆n1
+
∆f(wA2 )
∆wA2
.
µ
−r
A.α.δ
2
¶
−∆f(w
B
2 )
∆wB2
.
µ
−r
B.α.δ
2
¶
= 0 (11)
θ[(rB − β.rA)− γ] = l(n1) (12)
where θ = α.δ.∆f(w
B
2 )
∆wB2
,β =
∆f(wA2 )/∆w
A
2
∆f(wB2 )/∆w
B
2
, γ = (1−α)/α
∆f(wB2 )/∆w
B
2
and l(n1) =
−∆g(n1)
∆n1
,. Let l−1exist. From above we can write
n1 = l
−1 £θ ©(rB − β.rA)− γª¤ . (13)
Clearly nA1 > 0, if r
B − β.rA > γ, where γ > 0. Since wB2 > wA2 , β > 1.
Given, ∆
2g(n1)
∆n21
< 0, we can show
∆2V A
∆(nA1 )
2
< 0 if [(rB)2 − β.(rA)2] where β = ∆
2f(wA2 )/∆(w
A
2 )
2
∆2f(wB2 )/∆(w
B
2 )
2
.
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Let β = max{pβ, β}. Therefore the restriction rB−βrA > γ is sufficient
to show that there will be an increase in conflict.
Step 2: When nA1 < n
B
1 , increasing n
A
1 does not make A worse-off. Q.E.D.
In this case, even though there was equality in the first period, a situation
of conflict still arose. The disadvantaged group anticipated that in period 2,
the other group will have higher wealth and hence greater bargaining power.
This bargaining power would mean that the group with higher wealth will
also corner a higher proportion of the output in period 2. Therefore, it is in
the interest of the group with anticipated lower wealth in period 2, to engen-
der conflict in the first period so as to reduce the other group’s bargaining
strength. The anticipated inequality, however, has to be significant to result
in conflict.
Remark 2. Due to conflict, the total output produced in the economy, is
less than (2 + g). Hence, compared to the complete equality case, we have
loss in output arising from conflict.
Empirical evidence (Nafziger and Auvien (2002)) have shown that coun-
tries with high GDP have less conflict. In our model, whether a country is
rich or poor is defined by the initial level of wealth. Our next proposition
deals with what happens to the level of conflict in a richer society. In this
framework, we increase the initial level of wealth for both groups, making
the society richer.
Proposition 4 Let nA1 > n
B
1 ≥ 0. Then an increase in the initial level of
wealth, such that ∆wA1 ≤ ∆wB1 , will reduce conflict.
Proof: See Appendix Q.E.D.
This shows that if raising the level of current wealth reduces the negative
impact of a high anticipated future inequality.
3.3 Wealth inequality in period 1 only
Now consider the case where wA1 > w
B
1 and r
A, rB are such that wA2 = w
B
2
7.
From (4) and (5) we can show that, yA1 > y
B
1 and y
A
2 = y
B
2 . We assume that
in both periods the groups prefer joint production rather than produce on
their own.
7Notice that rA and rB will depend on n1. To be more precise, for every n1, we will
be able to find rA, rB such that wA2 = w
B
2 .
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Proposition 5 Let wA1 > w
B
1 and w
A
2 = w
B
2 . There will be no conflict in the
society.
Proof: Similar to Proposition 1 and hence omitted. Q.E.D.
Few remarks are in order here. What the above proposition clearly show
that initial inequality does not play any role in engendering conflict. What
matters is anticipated future inequality. This intuition goes against standard
notion in the literature where high initial inequality does result in conflict.
Moreover, in this situation, if group A anticipated being seriously disadvan-
taged in the future, it would initiate conflict in the current period, even
though in the current period it happens to be the advantaged group in the
sense of having more initial wealth than group B.
4 Conclusion
There are several interesting conclusions that emerge from the above results.
First, we have shown that anticipated future inequality can play an im-
portant role in generating conflict. Notice that conflict emerges here even
though there was no inequality to begin with. Also, as Proposition 5 shows,
current inequality without future inequality, does not lead to any conflict.
This may shed some light on why some research conclude that inequality
does not play any role in conflict (see Collier (2000)).
Second, the anticipated inequality has to be significant to result in con-
flict. Future inequality as such may not lead to conflict. Even if the rate of
returns of the different groups are different, thus resulting in higher wealth
for one group, the difference may not be high enough to make it worthwhile
for the disadvantaged group to initiate conflict. Note, under conflict, the
disadvantaged group also suffers from the loss in consumption and savings
due to an overall lower output.
Third, the model clearly show that high level of initial wealth will result
in low conflict. Our results are in line with the empirical evidence which
shows that conflict will be less in richer countries. Further, conflict in this
model, leads to a lower output in both periods. In period 1 it reduces output
because of conflict, and in period 2 the output is reduced due to lower growth.
The paper can be extended in several directions. One can generalize the
model by making the rate of returns, rA and rB uncertain. In that case, the
expectation of each group over the others rate of return becomes crucial. The
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analysis then gets more complicated and needs further investigation. Also,
we implicitly assume that enforceable contracts are not viable and therefore
parties cannot forge some kind of ex-ante contract to avoid conflict. That will
become difficult to sustain if we allow for long term interaction between the
groups, instead of just two periods. In such case, there may be a possibility
of overcoming the incomplete contract problem. What the structure will be
of such long term contracts under uncertainty is an issue for future research.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 4.
First we calculate the impact of ∆wA1 and ∆w
B
1 on n1. We show that
∆nA1
∆wA1
> 0 and ∆n
A
1
∆wB1
< 0. This means that conflict will increase if we increase
wA1 and it will decrease if we increase w
B
1 . Next we show that the decrease
in conflict from an increase in wB1 can outweigh the increase in conflict from
an increase in wA1 . Therefore, if we increase the level of initial wealth such
that ∆wA1 ≤ ∆wB1 it will lead to an overall decrease in conflict.
Proof: nA1 > n
B
1 ≥ 0 implies wB2 > wA2 . From (12) we can write
l(nA1 ) = θ
£
(rB − β.rA)− γ
¤
.
If wA1 increase, it will also increase w
A
2 as w
A
2 = r
A.(α.yA1 + w
A
1 ).
∆l(nA1 )
∆nA1
∆nA1
∆wA1
= −θ. ∆β
∆wA2
.
∆wA2
∆wA1
.rA = −θ. ∆β
∆wA2
.(rA)2 > 0 (A1)
Since ∆
2f(wA2 )
∆(wA2 )
2 < 0, θ.
∆β
∆wA2
= α.δ.
∆2f(wA2 )
∆(wA2 )
2 < 0. We know
∆l(nA1 )
∆nA1
> 0, hence
∆nA1
∆wA1
> 0.
For a ∆ increase in wB1 we have
∆l(nA1 )
∆nA1
∆nA1
∆wB1
=
∆θ
∆wB2
.
∆wB2
∆wB1
.λ−θ. ∆β
∆wB2
.
∆wB2
∆wB1
.rA−θ. ∆γ
∆wB2
.
∆wB2
∆wB1
< 0. (A2)
where λ = (rB − β.rA − γ) > 0 and ∆w
B
2
∆wB1
= rB. It is easy to check that
∆θ
∆wB2
< 0, ∆β
∆wB2
> 0, ∆γ
∆wB2
> 0. Also θ. ∆β
∆wB2
= −α.δ.∆f(w
A
2 )/∆w
A
2
∆f(wB2 )/∆w
B
2
.
∆2f(wB2 )
∆(wB2 )
2 .
As wB2 > w
A
2 we have
∆f(wA2 )/∆w
A
2
∆f(wB2 )/∆w
B
2
> 1 and ∆
2f(wB2 )
∆(wB2 )
2 <
∆2f(wA2 )
∆(wA2 )
2 < 0,
comparing (A1) and (A2) we can conclude
−θ. ∆β
∆wA2
.(rA)2 − θ. ∆β
∆wB2
.rB.rA < 0.
Hence, ¯¯¯¯
∆l(nA1 )
∆nA1
∆nA1
∆wB1
¯¯¯¯
>
¯¯¯¯
∆l(nA1 )
∆nA1
∆nA1
∆wA1
¯¯¯¯
.
The decrease in nA1 due to an increase in w
B
1 , will be greater than an
increase in nA1 from an increase in w
A
1 . Hence increase of wealth in the
society will reduce conflict. Q.E.D.
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